The Predictioneer’s Game: Using the logic of brazen self-interest to see and shape the future, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Random House (2009).
Wouldn’t it be nice to not only predict how political disputes will be resolved, but also devise strategies to shape the outcomes? Indeed, and “the predictioneer” could expect to be richly rewarded. Thus, the author recounts being offered a success fee of potentially over $1 billion for helping Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to retain power. (Mesquita declined the offer, p. 137).
The basic concept is game theory, where the analyst identifies the prime players and determines, for each, their preferences as to the outcome (including desire to receive public credit or not), relative influence or “clout,” and determination about getting his or her way. It is assumed that the players will act “rationally” in pursuing their goals, even if their goals may not be commendable.
Be prepared for what may seem a cynical view of human behavior, i.e., the primary objective of political leaders is to gain and retain power, senior corporate leaders may not be worried about the long-term interests of the shareholders, etc. Also, the belief that some people just cannot be understood, e.g., the North Koreans or suicide bombers, is wrong. You simply need to consult the right experts or sources to come up with the assessments that are needed.
The details of Mesquita’s model are not provided (most readers would not be interested anyway), but many applications are described: (a) historical events that could have been predicted and perhaps changed (decline of Sparta after winning the Peloponnesian War, deal struck between Columbus and Ferdinand & Isabella, how the British could have averted World War I); (b) client engagements for the US government (strategic assessments) and private firms (litigation, acquisitions); and (c) academic analyses of several issues that are still pending (e.g., will Iraq and Iran make a deal, will efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions be successful?).
Example: a large company was embroiled in criminal litigation with the US Department of Justice. Mesquita was supposedly able to “engineer” a better settlement for the client than would have been achieved if pre-trial discussions had proceeded along the contemplated lines (with hardliners within the Department of Justice eventually maneuvering their boss into a hardball stance). He did this using the client’s data and the logic of his computer model, never mind the merits of the legal issues. Pages 89-101.
Mesquita’s claims for his model are suspiciously one-sided. Thus, he mentions only one significant forecasting error: a 1990s prediction that HillaryCare would be enacted did not prove out, supposedly due to a fluke event (the fall from grace of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Dan Rostenkowski, D-IL)
Some of the cases sound overly simplistic. For example, does one really need a sophisticated computer model to conclude that leaving 50,000 US troops in Iraq for an indefinite period might have a big effect on the future behavior of key Iraqi leaders? And can it really be that the US could persuade Pakistan to pursue internal militant groups more aggressively simply by doubling the foreign aid they are receiving?
The final chapter accepts the manmade global warming theory at face value, but concludes that the nations of the world will not enforce the commitments to curb greenhouse gas emissions that they make. Happily, however, research will establish ways to produce dirt-cheap energy from the wind, sun, etc. Really? Most scientific experts doubt that renewable energy will become genuinely cost competitive any time soon, and this prediction surely did not come out of the author’s rigorous computer model.
Conclusion: “The Predictioneer’s Game” is very interesting, but read it with a proverbial “grain of salt.”